The Nature and Attributes of God

I. As Known Through Natural Reason

A. Infinity of God

B. Unity or Unicity of God

C. Simplicity of God

D. Divine Personality

II. As Known Through Faith

A. Eternity

B. Immensity and Ubiquity, or Omnipresence

C. Immutability

D. The Divine Attributes

1. Divine Knowledge

2. The Divine Will

3. Intellect and Will (Providence, Predestination, and

Reprobation)

I. AS KNOWN THROUGH NATURAL REASON

("THE GOD OF THE PHILOSOPHERS")

Having established by inductive inference the self-existence of a personal First

Cause distinct from matter and from the human mind (see EXISTENCE OF

GOD), we now proceed by deductive analysis to examine the nature and

attributes of this Being to the extent required by our limited philosophical scope.

We will treat accordingly of

the infinity,

unity or unicity, and

simplicity of God, adding

some remarks on Divine personality.

A. INFINITY OF GOD

When we say that God is infinite, we mean that He is unlimited in every kind of

perfection or that every conceivable perfection belongs to Him in the highest

conceivable way. In a different sense we sometimes speak, for instance, of

infinite time or space, meaning thereby time of such indefinite duration or space

of such indefinite extension that we cannot assign any fixed limit to one or the

other. Care should be taken not to confound these two essentially different

meanings of the term. Time and space, being made up of parts in duration or

extension, are essentially finite by comparison with God's infinity. Now we assert

that God is infinitely perfect in the sense explained, and that His infinity is

deducible from His self-existence. For a self-existent being, if limited at all, could

be limited only by itself; to be limited by another would imply causal dependence

on that other, which the very notion of self-existence excludes. But the

self-existing cannot be conceived as limiting itself, in the sense of curtailing its

perfection of being, without ceasing to be self-existing. Whatever it is, it is

necessarily; its own essence is the sole reason or explanation of its existence,

so that its manner of existence must be as unchangeable as its essence, and to

suggest the possibility of an increase or diminution of perfection would be to

suggest the absurdity of a changeable essence. It only remains, then, to say

that whatever perfection is compatible with its essence is actually realized in a

self-existing being; but as there is no conceivable perfection as such -- that is, no

expression of positive being as such -- that is not compatible with the essence of

the self-existent, it follows that the self-existent must be infinite in all perfection.

For self-existence itself is absolute positive being and positive being cannot

contradict, and cannot therefore limit, positive being.

This general, and admittedly very abstract, conclusion, as well as the reasoning

which supports it, will be rendered more intelligible by a brief specific illustration

of what it involves.

(i) When, in speaking of the Infinite, we attribute all conceivable perfections to

Him, we must not forget that the predicates we employ to describe perfections

derive their meaning and connotation in the first instance from their application to

finite beings; and on reflection it is seen that we must distinguish between

different kinds of perfections, and that we cannot without palpable contradiction

attribute all the perfections of creatures in the same way to God. Some

perfections are such that even in the abstract, they necessarily imply or connote

finiteness of being or imperfection; while some others do not of themselves

necessarily connote imperfection. To the first class belong all material

perfections -- extension, sensibility and the like -- and certain spiritual perfections

such as rationality (as distinct from simple intelligence); to the second class

belong such perfections as being truth, goodness, intelligence, wisdom, justice,

holiness, etc. Now while it cannot be said that God is infinitely extended, or that

He feels or reasons in an infinite way, it can be said that He is infinitely good,

intelligent, wise, just, holy, etc. -- in other words, while perfections of the second

class are attributed to God formally (i.e., without any change in the proper

meaning of the predicates which express them), those of the first class can only

be attributed to Him eminently and equivalently, (i.e. whatever positive being they

express belongs to God as their cause in a much higher and more excellent way

than to the creatures in which they formally exist). By means of this important

distinction, which Agnostics reject or neglect, we are able to think and to speak

of the Infinite without being guilty of contradiction, and the fact that men generally

-- even Agnostics themselves when off their guard -- recognize and use the

distinction, is the best proof that it is pertinent and well founded. Ultimately it is

only another way of saying that, given an infinite cause and finite effects,

whatever pure perfection is discovered in the effects must first exist in the cause

(via affirmationis) and at the same time that whatever imperfection is discovered

in the effects must be excluded from the cause (via negationis vel exclusionis).

These two principles do not contradict, but only balance and correct one another.

(ii) Yet sometimes men are led by a natural tendency to think and speak of God

as if He were a magnified creature -- more especially a magnified man -- and this

is known as anthropomorphism. Thus God is said to see or hear, as if He had

physical organs, or to be angry or sorry, as if subject to human passions: and

this perfectly legitimate and more or less unavoidable use of metaphor is often

quite unfairly alleged to prove that the strictly Infinite is unthinkable and

unknowable, and that it is really a finite anthrpomorhic God that men worship.

But whatever truth there may be in this charge as applied to Polytheistic

religions, or even to the Theistic beliefs of rude and uncultured minds, it is untrue

and unjust when directed against philosophical Theism. The same reasons that

justify and recommend the use of metaphorical language in other connections

justify and recommended it here, but no Theist of average intelligence ever thinks

of understanding literally the metaphors he applies, or hears applied by others, to

God, any more than he means to speak literally when he calls a brave man a

lion, or a cunning one a fox.

(iii) Finally it should be observed that, while predicating pure perfections literally

both of God and of creatures, it is always understood that these predicates are

true in an infinitely higher sense of God than of creatures, and that there is no

thought of coordinating or classifying God with creatures. This is technically

expressed by saying that all our knowledge of God is analogical, and that all

predicates applied to God and to creatures are used analogically, not univocally

(see ANALOGY). I may look at a portrait or at its living original, and say of either,

with literal truth, that is a beautiful face. And this is an example of analogical

predication. Beauty is literally and truly realized both in the portrait and its living

original, and retains its proper meaning as applied to either; there is sufficient

likeness or analogy to justify literal predication but there is not that perfect

likeness or identity between painted and living beauty which univocal predication

would imply. And similarly in the case of God and creatures. What we

contemplate directly is the portrait of Him painted, so to speak, by Himself on

the canvas of the universe and exhibiting in a finite degree various perfections,

which, without losing their proper meaning for us, are seen to be capable of being

realized in an infinite degree; and our reason compels us to infer that they must

be and are so realized in Him who is their ultimate cause.

Hence we admit, in conclusion, that our knowledge of the Infinite is inadequate,

and necessarily so since our minds are only finite. But this is very different from

the Agnostic contention that the Infinite is altogether unknowable, and that the

statements of Theists regarding the nature and attributes of God are so many

plain contradictions. It is only by ignoring the well-recognized rules of predication

that have just been explained, and consequently by misunderstanding and

misrepresenting the Theistic position, that Agnostics succeed in giving an air of

superficial plausibility to their own philosophy of blank negation. Anyone who

understands those rules, and has learned to think clearly, and trusts his own

reason and common sense, will find it easy to meet and refute Agnostic

arguments, most of which, in principle, have been anticipated in what precedes.

Only one general observation need be made here -- that the principles to which

the Agnostic philosopher must appeal in his attempt to invalidate religious

knowledge would, if consistently applied, invalidate all human knowledge and

lead to universal scepticism -- and it is safe to say that, unless absolute

scepticism becomes the philosophy of mankind, Agnosticism will never supplant

religion.

B. UNITY OR UNICITY OF GOD

Obviously there can be only one infinite being, only one God. If several were to

exist, none of them would really be infinite, for, to have plurality of natures at all,

each should have some perfection not possessed by the others. This will be

readily granted by every one who admits the infinity of God, and there is no need

to delay in developing what is perfectly clear. It should be noted, however, that

some Theistic philosophers prefer to deduce unicity from self-existence and

infinity from both combined, and in a matter so very abstract it is not surprising

that slight differences of opinion should arise. But we have followed what seems

to us to be the simpler and clearer line of argument. The metaphysical argument

by which unicity, as distinct from infinity, is deduced from self-existence seems

to be very obscure, while on the other hand infinity, as distinct from unicity,

seems to be clearly implied in self-existence as such. If the question, for

example, be asked: Why may there not be several self-existing beings? The only

satisfactory answer, as it seems to us, is this: Because a self-existent being as

such is necessarily infinite, and there cannot be several infinities. The unity of

God as the First Cause might also be inductively inferred from the unity of the

universe as we know it; but as the suggestion might be made, and could not be

disproved, that there may be another or even several universes of which we have

no knowledge, this argument would not be absolutely conclusive.

C. SIMPLICITY OF GOD

God is a simple being or substance excluding every kind of composition,

physical or metaphysical. Physical or real composition is either substantial or

accidental -- substantial, if the being in question consists of two or more

substantial principles, forming parts of a composite whole, as man for example,

consists of body and soul; accidental, if the being in question, although simple in

its substance (as is the human soul), is capable of possessing accidental

perfections (like the actual thoughts and volition of man's soul) not necessarily

identical with its substance. Now it is clear that an infinite being cannot be

substantially composite, for this would mean that infinity is made up of the union

or addition of finite parts -- a plain contradiction in terms. Nor can accidental

composition be attributed to the infinite since even this would imply a capacity for

increased perfection, which the very notion of the infinite excludes. There is not,

therefore, and cannot be any physical or real composition in God.

Neither can there be that kind of composition which is known as metaphysical,

and which results from "the union of diverse concepts referring to the same real

thing in such a way that none of them by itself signifies either explicitly or even

implicitly the whole reality signified by their combination." Thus every actual

contingent being is a metaphysical compound of essence and existence, and

man in particular, according to the definition, is a compound of animal and

rational. Essence as such in relation to a contingent being merely implies its

conceivableness or possibility, and abstracts from actual existence; existence

as such must be added before we can speak of the being as actual. But this

distinction, with the composition it implies, cannot be applied to the self-existent

or infinite being in whom essence and existence are completely identified. We

say of a contingent being that it has a certain nature or essence, but of the

self-existent we say that it is its own nature or essence. There is no composition

therefore of essence and existence -- or of potentiality and actuality -- in God, nor

can the composition of genus and specific difference, implied for example in the

definition of man as a rational animal, be attributed to Him. God cannot be

classified or defined, as contingent beings are classified and defined; for there is

no aspect of being in which He is perfectly similar to the finite, and consequently

no genus in which He can be included. From this it follows that we cannot know

God adequately in the way in which He knows Himself, but not, as the Agnostic

contends, that our inadequate knowledge is not true as far as it goes. In

speaking of a being who transcends the limitations of formal logical definition our

propositions are an expression of real truth, provided that what we state is in

itself intelligible and not self-contradictory; and there is nothing unintelligible or

contradictory in what Theists predicate of God. It is true that no single predicate

is adequate or exhaustive as a description of His infinite perfection, and that we

need to employ a multitude of predicates, as if at first sight infinity could be

reached by multiplication. But at the same time we recognize that this is not so

-- being repugnant to the Divine simplicity; and that while truth, goodness,

wisdom, holiness and other attributes, as we conceive and define them express

perfections that are formally distinct, yet as applied to God they are all ultimately

identical in meaning and describe the same ultimate reality -- the one infinitely

perfect and simple being.

D. DIVINE PERSONALITY

When we say that God is a personal being we mean that He is intelligent and

free and distinct from the created universe. Personality as such expresses

perfection, and if human personality as such connotes imperfection, it must be

remembered that, as in the case of similar predicates, this connotation is

excluded when we attribute personality to God. It is principally by way of

opposition to Pantheism that Divine personality is emphasized by the Theistic

philosopher. Human personality, as we know it, is one of the primary data of

consciousness, and it is one of those created perfections which must be realized

formally (although only analogically) in the First Cause. But Pantheism would

require us to deny the reality of any such perfection, whether in creatures or in

the Creator, and this is one of the fundamental objections to any form of

Pantheistic teaching. Regarding the mystery of the Trinity or three Divine

Persons in God, which can be known only by revelation, it is enough to say here

that properly understood the mystery contains no contradiction, but on the

contrary adds much that is helpful to our inadequate knowledge of the infinite.

II. AS KNOWN THROUGH FAITH

("THE GOD OF REVELATION")

Reason, as we have seen, teaches that God is one simple and infinitely perfect

spiritual substance or nature. Sacred Scripture and the Church teach the same.

The creeds, for example, usually begin with a profession of faith in the one true

God, Who is the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, and is also, in the words

of the Vatican Council, "omnipotent, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite

in intellect and will and in every perfection" (Sess. III, cap. i, De Deo). The best

way in which we can describe the Divine nature is to say that it is infinitely

perfect, or that God is the infinitely perfect Being; but we must always remember

that even being itself, the most abstract and universal term we possess, is

predicated of God and of creatures not univocally or identically, but only

analogically. But other predicates, which, as applied to creatures, express

certain specific determinations of being, are also used of God -- analogically, if in

themselves they express pure or unmixed perfection, but only metaphorically if

they necessarily connote imperfection. Now of such predicates as applied to

creatures we distinguish between those that are used in the concrete to denote

being as such more or less determined (v.g., substance, spirit, etc.), and those

that are used in the abstract or adjectively to denote determinations, or qualities,

or attributes of being (v.g., good, goodness; intelligent, intelligence, etc.); and we

find it useful to transfer this distinction to God, and to speak of the Divine nature

or essence and Divine attributes being careful at the same time, by insisting on

Divine simplicity, to avoid error or contradiction in its application. For, as applied

to God, the distinction between nature and attributes, and between the attributes

themselves, is merely logical and not real. The finite mind is not capable of

comprehending the Infinite so as adequately to describe its essence by any

single concept or term; but while using a multitude of terms, all of which are

analogically true, we do not mean to imply that there is any kind of composition

in God. Thus, as applied to creatures, goodness and justice, for example, are

distinct from each other and from the nature or substance of the beings in whom

they are found, and if finite limitations compel us to speak of such perfections in

God as if they were similarly distinct, we know, nevertheless, and are ready,

when needful, to explain, that this is not really so, but that all Divine attributes

are really identical with one another and with the Divine essence.

The Divine attributes or perfections which may thus logically be distinguished are

very numerous, and it would be a needless task to attempt to enumerate them

fully. But among them some are recognized as being of fundamental importance,

and to these in particular is the term attributes applied and special notice

devoted by theologians -- though there is no rigid agreement as to the number or

classification of such attributes. As good a classification as any other is that

based on the analogy of entitative and operative perfections in creatures -- the

former qualifying nature or essence as such and abstracting from activity, the

latter referring especially to the activity of the nature in question. Another

distinction is often made between physical, and moral or ethical, attributes -- the

former of themselves abstracting from, while the latter directly express, moral

perfection. But without labouring with the question of classification, it will suffice

to notice separately those attributes of leading importance that have not been

already explained. Nothing need be added to what has been said above

concerning self-existence, infinity, unity, and simplicity (which belong to the

entitative class); but eternity, immensity, and immutability (also of the entitative

class), together with the active attributes, whether physical or moral, connected

with the Divine intellect and will, call for some explanation here.

A. ETERNITY

By saying that God is eternal we mean that in essence, life, and action He is

altogether beyond temporal limits and relations. He has neither beginning, nor

end, nor duration by way of sequence or succession of moments. There is no

past or future for God -- but only an eternal present. If we say that He was or that

He acted, or that He will be or will act, we mean in strictness that He is or that

He acts; and this truth is well expressed by Christ when He says (John, viii,

58-A.V.): "Before Abraham was, I am." Eternity, therefore, as predicated of God,

does not mean indefinite duration in time -- a meaning in which the term is

sometimes used in other connections -- but it means the total exclusion of the

finiteness which time implies. We are obliged to use negative language in

describing it, but in itself eternity is a positive perfection, and as such may be

best defined in the words of Boethius as being "interminabilis vitae tota simul et

perfecta possessio," i.e. possession in full entirety and perfection of life without

beginning, end, or succession.

The eternity of God is a corollary from His self-existence and infinity. Time being

a measure of finite existence, the infinite must transcend it. God, it is true,

coexists with time, as He coexists with creatures, but He does not exist in time,

so as to be subject to temporal relations: His self-existence is timeless. Yet the

positive perfection expressed by duration as such, i.e. persistence and

permanence of being, belongs to God and is truly predicated of Him, as when He

is spoken of, for example, as "Him that is, and that was and that is to come"

(Apoc., i, 4); but the strictly temporal connotation of such predicates must

always be corrected by recalling the true notion of eternity.

B. IMMENSITY AND UBIQUITY, OR OMNIPRESENCE

Space, like time, is one of the measures of the finite, and as by the attribute of

eternity, we describe God's transcendence of all temporal limitations, so by the

attribute of immensity we express His transcendent relation to space. There is

this difference, however, to be noted between eternity and immensity, that the

positive aspect of the latter is more easily realized by us, and is sometimes

spoken of, under the name of omnipresenee, or ubiquity, as if it were a distinct

attribute. Divine immensity means on the one hand that God is necessarily

present everywhere in space as the immanent cause and sustainer of creatures,

and on the other hand that He transcends the limitations of actual and possible

space, and cannot be circumscribed or measured or divided by any spatial

relations. To say that God is immense is only another way of saying that He is

both immanent and transcendent in the sense already explained. As some one

has metaphorically and paradoxically expressed it, "God's centre is everywhere,

His circumference nowhere."

That God is not subject to spatial limitations follows from His infinite simplicity;

and that He is truly present in every place or thing -- that He is omnipresent or

ubiquitous -- follows from the fact that He is the cause and ground of all reality.

According to our finite manner of thinking we conceive this presence of God in

things spatial as being primarily a presence of power and operation -- immediate

Divine efficiency being required to sustain created beings in existence and to

enable them to act; but, as every kind of Divine action ad extra is really identical

with the Divine nature or essence, it follows that God is really present everywhere

in creation not merely per virtuten et operationem, but per essentiam. In other

words God Himself, or the Divine nature, is in immediate contact with, or

immanent in, every creature -- conserving it in being and enabling it to act. But

while insisting on this truth we must, if we would avoid contradiction, reject every

form of the pantheistic hypothesis. While emphasizing Divine immanence we

must not overlook Divine transcendence.

There is no lack of Scriptural or ecclesiastical testimonies asserting God's

immensity and ubiquity. It is enough to refer for example to:

Heb. i, 3 iv, 12, 13

Acts, xvii, 24, 27, 28;

Eph., i, 23;

Col., i, ;6, 17,

Ps. cxxxviii, 7-12;

Job, xii, 10, etc.

C. IMMUTABILITY

In God "there is no change, nor shadow of alteration" (James, i, 17); "They [i.e.

"the works of thy hands"] shall perish, but thou shalt continue: and they shall all

grow old as a garment. And as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall

be changed: but thou art the selfsame and thy years shall not fail" (Heb., i,

10-12, Ps. ci, 26-28. Cf. Mal., iii, 6; Heb., xiii, 8). These are some of the

Scriptural texts which clearly teach Divine immutability or unchangeableness,

and this attribute is likewise emphasized in church teaching, as by the Council of

Nicaea against the Arians, who attributed mutability to the Logos (Denzinger,

54-old No. 18), and by the Vatican Council in its famous definition.

That the Divine nature is essentially immutable, or incapable of any internal

change, is an obvious corollary from Divine infinity. Changeableness implies the

capacity for increase or diminution of perfection, that is, it implies finiteness and

imperfection. But God is infinitely perfect and is necessarily what He is. It is true

that some attributes by which certain aspects of Divine perfection are described

are hypothetlcal or relative, in the sense that they presuppose the contingent fact

of creation: omnipresence, for example, presupposes the actual existence of

spatial beings. But it is obvious that the mutability implied in this belongs to

creatures, and not to the Creator; and it is a strange confusion of thought that

has led some modern Theists -- even professing Christians -- to maintain that

such attributes can be laid aside by God, and that the Logos in becoming

incarnate actually did lay them aside, or at least ceased from their active

exercise. But as creation itself did not affect the immutability of God, so neither

did the incarnation of a Divine Person; whatever change was involved in either

case took place solely in the created nature.

D. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

The so-called active Divine attributes are best treated in connection with the

Divine Intellect and Will -- principles of Divine operation ad extra -- to which they

are all ultimately reducible.

1. Divine Knowledge

Description of the Divine Knowledge

That God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of all things,

follows from His infinite perfection. In the first place He knows and comprehends

Himself fully and adequately, and in the next place He knows all created objects

and comprehends their finite and contingent mode of being. Hence He knows

them individually or singularly in their finite multiplicity, knows everything possible

as well as actual; knows what is bad as well as what is good. Everything, in a

word, which to our finite minds signifies perfection and completeness of

knowledge may be predicated of Divine omniscience, and it is further to be

observed that it is on Himself alone that God depends for His knowledge. To

make Him in any way dependent on creatures for knowledge of created objects

would destroy His infinite perfection and supremacy. Hence it is in His eternal,

unchangeable, comprehensive knowledge of Himself or of His own infinite being

that God knows creatures and their acts, whether there is question of what is

actual or merely possible. Indeed, Divine knowledge itself is really identical with

Divine essence, as are all the attributes and acts of God; but according to our

finite modes of thought we feel the need of conceiving them distinctly and of

representing the Divine essence as the medium or mirror in which the Divine

intellect sees all truth. Moreover, although the act of Divine knowledge is infinitely

simple in itself, we feel the need of further distinctions -- not as regards the

knowledge in itself, but as regards the multiplicity of finite objects which it

embraces. Hence the universally recognized distinction between the knowledge

of vision (scientia visionis) and that of simple intelligence (simplicis

intelligentiae), and the famous controversy regarding the scientia media. We

shall briefly explain this distinction and the chief difficulties involved in this

controversy.

Distinctions in the Divine Knowledge

In classifying the objects of Divine omniscience the most obvious and

fundamental distinction is between things that actually exist at any time, and

those that are merely possible. And it is in reference to these two classes of

objects that the distinction is made between knowledge "of vision" and "of simple

intelligence"; the former referring to things actual, and the latter to the merely

possible. This distinction might appear at first sight to be absolutely

comprehensive and adequate to the purpose for which we introduce distinctions

at all, but some difficulty is felt once the question is raised of God's knowledge of

the acts of creatures endowed with free will. That God knows infallibly and from

eternity what, for example, a certain man, in the exercise of free will, will do or

actually does in any given circumstances, and what he might or would actually

have done in different circumstances is beyond doubt -- being a corollary from the

eternal actuality of Divine knowledge. So to speak, God has not to wait on the

contingent and temporal event of the man's free choice to know what the latter's

action will be; He knows it from eternity. But the difficulty is: how, from our finite

point of view, to interpret and explain the mysterious manner of God's knowledge

of such events without at the same time sacrificing the free will of the creature.

The Dominican school has defended the view that the distinction between

knowledge of "vision" and of "simple intelligence" is the only one we need or

ought to employ in our effort to conceive and describe Divine omniscience, even

in relation to the free acts of intelligent creatures. These acts, if they ever take

place, are known or foreknown by God as if they were eternally actual -- and this

is admitted by all; otherwise they remain in the category of the merely possible --

and this is what the Jesuit school denies, pointing for example to statements

such as that of Christ regarding the people of Tyre and Sidon, who would have

done penance had they received the same graces as the Jews (Matt., xi, 21).

This school therefore maintains that to the actual as such and the purely

possible we must add another category of objects: hypothetical facts that may

never become actual, but would become actual were certain conditions realized.

The hypothetical truth of such facts, it is rightly contended, is more than mere

possibility, yet less than actuality; and since God knows such facts in their

hypothetical character there is good reason for introducing a distinction to cover

them -- and this is the scientia media. And it is clear that even acts that take

place and as such fall finally under the knowledge of vision may be conceived as

falling first under the knowledge of simple intelligence and then under the scientia

media, the progressive formula would be:

first, it is possible Peter would do so and so;

second, Peter would do so and so, given certain conditions;

third, Peter will do or does so and so.

Now, were it not for the differences that lie behind there would probably be no

objection raised to scientia media, but the distinction itself is only the prelude to

the real problem. Admitting that God knows from eternity the future free acts of

creatures the question is how or in what way He knows them or rather how we

are to conceive and explain by analogy the manner of the divine foreknowledge,

which in itself is beyond our powers of comprehension? It is admitted that God

knows them first as objects of the knowledge of simple intelligence; but does he

know them also as objects of the scientia media, i.e. hypothetically and

independently of any decree of His will, determining their actuality, or does He

know them only in and through such decrees? The Dominican contention is that

God's knowledge of future free acts depends on the decrees of His free will which

predetermine their actuality by means of the praemotio physica. God knows, for

example, that Peter will do so and so, because He has decreed from eternity so

to move Peter's free will that the latter will infallibly, although freely, cooperate

with, or consent to, the Divine premotion. In the case of good acts there is a

physical and intrinsic connection between the motion given by God and the

consent of Peter's will, while as regards morally bad acts, the immorality as such

-- which is a privation and not a positive entity -- comes entirely from the created

will.

The principal difficulties against this view are that in the first place it seems to do

away with human free will, and in the next place to make God responsible for sin.

Both consequences of course are denied by those who uphold it, but, making all

due allowance for the mystery which shrouds the subject, it is difficult to see how

the denial of free will is not logically involved in the theory of the praemotio

physica, how the will can be said to consent freely to a motion which is

conceived as predetermining consent; such explanations as are offered merely

amount to the assertion that, after all, the human will is free. The other difficulty

consists in the twofold fact that God is represented as giving the praemotio

physica in the natural order for the act of will by which the sinner embraces evil,

and that He withholds the supernatural praemotio or efficacious grace which is

essentially required for the performance of a salutary act. The Jesuit school, on

the other hand -- with whom probably a majority of independent theologians agree

-- using the scientia media maintains that we ought to conceive God's knowledge

of future free acts not as being dependent and consequent upon decrees of His

will, but in its character as hypothetical knowledge or being antecedent to them.

God knows in the scientia media what Peter would do if in given circumstances

he were to receive a certain aid, and this before any absolute decree to give that

aid is supposed. Thus there is no predetermination by the Divine of what the

human will freely chooses; it is not because God foreknows (having foredecreed)

a certain free act that that act takes place, but God foreknows it in the first

instance because as a matter of fact it is going to take place; He knows it as a

hypothetical objective fact before it becomes an object of the scientia visionis --

or rather this is how, in order to safeguard human liberty, we must conceive Him

as knowing it. It was thus, for example, that Christ knew what would have been

the results of His ministry among the people of Tyre and Sidon. But one must be

careful to avoid implying that God's knowledge is in any way dependent on

creatures, as if He had, so to speak, to await the actual event in time before

knowing infallibly what a free creature may choose to do. From eternity He

knows, but does not predetermine the creature's choice. And if it be asked how

we can conceive this knowledge to exist antecedently to and independently of

some act of the Divine will, on which all things contingent depend, we can only

say that the objective truth expressed by the hypothetical facts in question is

somehow reflected in the Divine Essence, which is the mirror of all truth, and that

in knowing Himself God knows these things also. Whichever way we turn we are

bound ultimate]y to encounter a mystery, and, when there is a question of

choosing between a theory which refers the mystery to God Himself and one

which only saves the truth of human freedom by making free-will itself a mystery,

most theologians naturally prefer the former alternative.

2. The Divine Will

Description of the Divine Will

(a) The highest perfections of creatures are reducible to functions of intellect and

will, and, as these perfections are realized analogically in God, we naturally pass

from considering Divine knowledge or intelligence to the study of Divine volition.

The object of intellect as such is the true; the object of will as such, the good. In

the case of God it is evident that His own infinite goodness is the primary and

necessary object of His will, created goodness being but a secondary and

contingent object. This is what the inspired writer means when he says: "The

Lord hath made all things for himself" (Prov., xvi, 4). The Divine will of course, like

the Divine intellect, is really identical with the Divine Essence but according to

our finite modes of thought we are obliged to speak of them as if they were

distinct and, just as the Divine intellect cannot be dependent on created objects

for its knowledge of them, neither can the Divine will be so dependent for its

volition. Had no creature ever been created, God would have been the same

self-sufficient being that He is, the Divine will as an appetitive faculty being

satisfied with the infinite goodness of the Divine Essence itself. This is what the

Vatican Council means by speaking of God as "most happy in and by Himself" --

not that He does not truly wish and love the goodness of creatures, which is a

participation of His own, but that He has no need of creatures and is in no way

dependent on them for His bliss.

(b) Hence it follows that God possesses the perfection of free will in an infinitely

eminent degree. That is to say, without any change in Himself or in His eternal

act of volition, He freely chooses whether or not creatures shall exist and what

manner of existence shall be theirs, and this choice or determination is an

exercise of that dominion which free will (liberty of indifference) essentially

expresses. In itself free will is an absolute and positive perfection, and as such is

most fully realized in God. Yet we are obliged to describe Divine liberty as we

have done relatively to its effects in creation, and, by way of negation, we must

exclude the imperfections associated with free will in creatures. These

imperfections may be reduced to two:

potentiality and mutability as opposed to immutable pure act, and

the power of choosing what is evil.

Only the second need be noticed here.

such, but only sub specie boni, i.e., what his will really embraces is some

aspect of goodness which he truly or falsely believes to be discoverable in the

evil act. Moral evil ultimately consists in choosing some such fancied good which

is known more or less clearly to be opposed to the Supreme Good, and it is

obvious that only a finite being can be capable of such a choice. God necessarily

loves Himself, who is the Supreme Good, and cannot wish anything that would

be opposed to Himself. Yet He permits the sins of creatures, and it has always

been considered one of the gravest problems of theism to explain why this is so.

We cannot enter on the Problem here, but must content ourselves with a few

brief observations.

First, however difficult or even mysterious, may be the problem of moral

evil for the theist, it is many times more difficult for every kind of

anti-theist.

Secondly, so far as we can judge the possibility of moral defection seems

to be a natural limitation of created free will, and can only be excluded

supernaturally, and, even viewing the question from a purely rational

standpoint, we are conscious on the whole that, whatever the final solution

may be, it is better that God should have created free beings capable of

sinning than that He should not have created free beings at all. Few men

would resign the faculty of free will just to escape the danger of abusing it.

Thirdly, some final solution, not at present apparent to our limited

intelligence, may be expected on merely rational grounds from the infinite

wisdom and justice of God, and supernatural revelation, which gives us

glimpses of the Divine plan, goes a long way towards supplying a

complete answer to the questions that most intimately concern us. The

clearly perceived truth to be emphasized here is that sin is hateful to God

and essentially opposed to His infinite holiness, and that the wilful discord

which sin introduces into the harmony of the universe will somehow be set

right in the end.

There is no need to delay in discussing mere physical as distinct from moral evil,

and it is enough to remark that such evil is not merely permitted, but willed by

God, not indeed in its character as evil, but as being, in such a universe as the

present, a means towards good and in itself relatively good.

Distinctions in the Divine Will

As distinctions are made in the Divine knowledge, so also in the Divine will, and

one of these latter is of sufficient importance to deserve a passing notice here.

This is the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will, and its

principal application is to the question of man's salvation. God, according to St.

Paul (I Tim., ii, 4),"wills that all men be saved", and this is explained to be an

antecedent will; that is to say, abstracting from circumstances and conditions

which may interfere with the fulfilment of God's will (e.g., sin on man's part,

natural order in the universe, etc.), He has a sincere wish that all men should

attain supernatural salvation, and this will is so far efficacious that He provides

and intends the necessary means of salvation for all -- sufficient actual graces for

those who are capable of cooperating with them and the Sacrament of Baptism

for infants. On the other hand, the consequent will takes account of those

circumstances and conditions and has reference to what God wills and executes

in consequence of them. It is thus, for example, that He condemns the wicked to

punishment after death and excludes unbaptized infants from the beatific vision.

3. Intellect and Will (Providence, Predestination, and Reprobation)

Several attributes and several aspects of Divine activity partake both of an

intellectual and a volitional character and must be treated from the combined

point of view. Such are omnipotence, holiness, justice, blessedness, and so

forth, but it is unnecessary to delay on such attributes which are

self-explanatory. Some notice, on the other hand, must be devoted to providence

and to the particular aspects of providence which we call predestination and

reprobation; and with a brief treatment of these which are elsewhere fully treated

this article will be concluded.

Providence

Providence may be defined as the scheme in the Divine mind by which all things

treated are ordered and guided efficiently to a common end or purpose (ratio

perductionis rerum in finem in mente divina existens). It includes an act of

intellect and an act of will, in other words knowledge and power. And that there is

such a thing as Divine Providence by which the entire universe is ruled clearly

follows from the fact that God is the author of all things and that order and

purpose must characterize the action of an intelligent creator. Nor is any truth

more insistently proclaimed in revelation. What the author of Wisdom (xiv, 3)

says of a particular thing is applicable to the universe as a whole: "But your

providence, O Father, governs it", and no more beautiful illustration of the same

truth has ever been given than that given by Christ Himself when He instances

God's care for the birds of the air and the lilies of the field (Matt., vi, 25 sq.). But

to rational creatures God's providential care is extended in a very special way,

yet not so as to do away with the utility and efficacy of prayer, whether for

temporal or spiritual favours (Matt., vii, 8), nor to disturb or override the efficiency

of secondary causes. It is in and through secondary causes that providence

ordinarily works, and no miracle, as a rule, is to be expected in answer to prayer

Predestination and reprobation

Predestination and reprobation are those special parts of Divine Providence which

deal specially with man's salvation or damnation in the present supernatural

order. Predestination is the foreknowledge on the part of God of those who will de

facto be saved and the preparation and bestowal of the means by which salvation

is obtained, while reprobation is the foreknowledge of those who will de facto be

damned and the permission of this eventuality by God. In both cases an act of

the intellect (infallible foreknowledge), and an act of the will are supposed; but

whereas in predestination the antecedent and consequent will is the same, in

reprobation God wills consequently what He does not antecedently will at all but

only permits, namely, the eternal punishment of the sinner.

Many controversies have arisen on the subject of predestination and reprobation,

into which we cannot enter here. But we shall briefly summarize the leading

points on which Catholic theologians have agreed and the points on which they

differ.

First, that predestination exists, i.e. that God knows from eternity with infallible

certainty who will be saved and that He wills from eternity to give them the

graces by which salvation will be secured, is obvious from reason and is taught

by Christ Himself (John, x, 27), and by St. Paul (Rom., viii, 29, 30).

Second, while God has this infallible foreknowledge, we on our part cannot have

an absolutely certain assurance that we are among the number of the

predestined -- unless indeed by means of a special Divine revelation such as we

know from experience is rarely, if ever, given. This follows from the Tridentine

condemnation of the teaching of the Reformers that we could and ought to

believe with the certainty of faith in our own justification and election (Sess. VI,

cap. ix, can. xiii-xv).

Third, the principal controverted point regarding predestination between Catholic

theologians is concerned with its gratuity, and in order to understand the

controversy it is necessary to distinguish between predestination in intention, i.e.

as it is a mere act of knowledge and of purpose in the Divine mind, and in

execution, i.e. as it means the actual bestowal of grace and of glory; and also

between predestination in the adequate sense, as referring both to grace and to

glory, and in the inadequate sense, as referring particularly to one's destination

to glory, and abstracting from the grace by which glory is obtained. Now,

speaking of predestination in execution, all Catholic theologians maintain

in opposition to Calvinists that it is not entirely gratuitous, but in the case

of adults depends partly on the free mercy of God and partly on human

cooperation; the actual bestowal of glory is at least partly a reward of true

merit.

Speaking of predestination in intention and in the adequate sense,

Catholic theologians agree that it is gratuitous; so understood it includes

the first grace which cannot be merited by man.

But if we speak of predestination in intention and in the inadequate sense,

i.e. to glory in abstraction from grace, there is no longer unanimity of

opinion. Most Thomists and several other theologians maintain that

predestination in this sense is gratuitous, i.e. God first destines a man to

glory antecedently to any foreseen merits, and consequently upon this

decrees to give the efficacious grace by which it is obtained.

Predestination to grace is the result of an entirely gratuitous

predestination to glory, and with this is combined for those not included in

the decree of election what is known as a negative reprobation. Other

theologians maintain on the contrary that there is no such thing as

negative reprobation, and that predestination to glory is not gratuitous but

dependent on foreseen merits. The order of dependence, according to

these theologians, is the same in predestination in intention as it is in

predestination in execution, and as already stated, the bestowal of glory

only follows upon actual merit in the case of adults. These have been the

two prevailing opinions followed for the most part in the schools, but a

third opinion, which is a somewhat subtle via media, has been put forward

by certain other theologians and defended with great skill by such an

authority as Billot. The gist of this view is that while negative reprobation

must be rejected, gratuitous election to glory ante praevisa merita must

be retained, and an effort is made to prove that these two may be logically

separated, a possibility overlooked by the advocates of the first two

opinions. Without entering into details here, it is enough to observe that

the success of this subtle expedient is very questionable.

Fourth, as regards reprobation,

all Catholic theologians are agreed that God foresees from eternity and

permits the final defection of some, but that the decree of His will

destining them to eternal damnation is not antecedent to but consequent

upon foreknowledge of their sin and their death in the state of sin. The first

part of this proposition is a simple corollary from Divine omniscience and

supremacy, and the second part is directed against Calvinistic and

Jansenistic teaching, according to which God expressly created some for

the purpose of punishing them, or at least that subsequently to the fall of

Adam, He leaves them in the state of damnation for the sake of exhibiting

His wrath. Catholic teaching on this point reechoes II Peter, iii, 9,

according to which God does not wish that any should perish but that all

should return to penance, and it is the teaching implied in Christ's own

description of the sentence that is to be pronounced on the damned,

condemnation being grounded not on the antecedent will of God, but on

the actual demerits of men themselves (e.g. Matt., xxv, 41).

So-called negative reprobation, which is commonly defended by those

who maintain election to glory antecedently to foreseen merits, means

that simultaneously with the predestination of the elect God either

positively excludes the damned from the decree of election to glory or at

least fails to include them in it, without, however, destining them to

positive punishment except consequently on their foreseen demerits. It is

this last qualification that distinguishes the doctrine of negative

reprobation from Calvinistic and Jansenistic teaching, leaving room, for

instance, for a condition of perfect natural happiness for those dying with

only original sin on their souls. But, notwithstanding this difference, the

doctrine ought to be rejected, for it is opposed very plainly to the teaching

of St. Paul regarding the universality of God's will to save all (I Tim., ii, 4),

and from a rational point of view it is difficult to reconcile with a worthy

concept of Divine justice.

P.J. TONER

Transcribed by Tomas Hancil

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VI

Nihil Obstat, September 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor

Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York